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D K: S R  
A B E
Geoffrey P. Miller*
In this paper, I address the question of the legal regulation of
corporate capital. This is a topic that cuts across a number of distinct
areas of law, and that displays significant differences between the
civil law used in Europe and elsewhere and the U.S. common law
system. It is fundamental to the regulation of important economic
institutions, notably banks, securities firms, and insurance companies. It is a question as well that lies at the core of the discipline of
corporate finance. Surprisingly, however, scholars have not attempted to unify these disparate strands of theory and of legal regulation in a single analytical structure. In this paper I offer a preliminary attempt at such a unification.
I. I
The attentive reader will not have missed the allusion to Karl
Marx in the title. Capital is not only a basic organizing principle for
law and theory in developed economic systems. It is also a subject
that formed the central focus of Karl Marx’s later work.1 And, although Marx’s predictions that capital would be increasingly concentrated in fewer and fewer hands turns out to have been erroneous, at least for modern industrialized nations, his insight that
capital is fundamental was not. That the concentration of capital
predicted by Marx did not happen is largely due to the fact that capital ended up being dispersed in the population: a rising middle class
came to own much of the means of production, and social wealth
began to be distributed to the needy through an increasingly active
welfare state.
This triumph of capitalism may be something to celebrate, but it
would be a mistake to view the dispersion of the means of production as costless in itself. On the contrary, as the means of production
*
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became dispersed in the large industrial enterprise, a whole new set
of problems arose which had their origin exactly in the fact that
capital was dispersed. It turned out that as the number of owners of
the business enterprise increased, and as their respective share in the
total ownership decreased, it became more and more difficult for
those who provided capital to the enterprise to control its behavior.
Free-rider and collective action problems entered the picture with a
vengeance.
The result was that effective control of the large-scale business
enterprise became lodged in a managerial class who were not themselves the major owners of the firm. Adolph Berle and Gardiner
Means recognized this fact in their classic  book, The Modern
Corporation and Private Property,2 which identified the separation
of ownership and control as the leading problem of the modern
business enterprise. Berle and Means viewed the gap between
ownership and control as a danger because corporate managers could
abuse their trust and run the corporation to serve their own interests
rather than the interests of those who provided capital to the firm.
The law and economics analysis of the corporate form, pioneered by Frank Easterbrook, Dan Fischel, Henry Manne, Ralph
Winter, and others, in many respects adopts a stance antithetical to
the pro-regulatory views of Berle and Means. Nevertheless, law and
economics draws its central inspiration from the Berle and Means
insight that ownership and control are separated in the large business enterprise. Law and economics has a different terminology
from Berle and Means, of course: instead of managerial “abuse,” law
and economics prefers the ostensibly less value-laden term “agency
costs.” But, moral connotations aside, the fundamental insight is the
same: the agents—that is, the managers of the large
corporation—have interests which differ from those of the
principals—that is, the providers of capital to the firm; and because
effective control over the firm’s actions lies in the agents, there is the
danger that the agents will act in a self-serving fashion to the
detriment of the owners. Many rules of corporate law, as well as
many privately-negotiated contractual arrangements, are then
2 Adolph A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation
and Private Property ().
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analyzed as means for limiting, although not eliminating these
agency costs of management.3
At the same time, law and economics recognized, as the BerleMeans tradition did not, that the conflict of interest was not limited
to discontinuities between capital providers and managers. There
were also important conflicts between different classes of capital
providers. Those who own corporate debt have a prior claim on the
firm’s assets and income stream, but only for the amount of principal
and interest specified in the debt contract. This makes debt holders
risk averse, to the point where debt holders would prefer that the
firm not engage in risky ventures even when the profits expected
from the venture if it succeeds are very high.
Those who hold the firm’s equity—the legal owners—have a
residual claim on the firm’s assets and income stream, in an amount
restricted, on the down side, only by the protection of limited liability. This makes equity holders risk-preferrers, in the sense that if the
firm engages in a risky venture, the profits from the venture if it is
successful, after debt service, are appropriated by the equity holders,
while the losses if the venture is unsuccessful are shared by the debt
holders if the firm becomes insolvent as a result.
These are significant differences between the law and economics
and Berle-Means traditions. But each is based on the fundamental
problem of conflicts of interest that result from the dispersal of the
firm’s capital among different investors. Notice further that both the
Berle and Means and the law and economics traditions really grow
out of this basic failure of Marx’s theory, namely, that capital did not
in the end become concentrated in a few hands, but rather became
so widely dispersed that the owners of the means of production lost
control over the ways in which the productive capacities of society
were utilized.
II. T (U) C  C R
With this background, let us consider the possible reasons why
the a legal system might elect to regulate capital structure. By capital
structure regulation, I mean regulation that controls in some fashion
3
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the amount of equity capital in a firm. This is different from the
economist’s definition of capital, which includes all claims on the
firm’s assets and income stream, debt as well as equity. To avoid
confusion in terminology, the term “capital” in American regulation
refers, roughly, to equity capital only, not to equity and debt together.
The basic puzzle of capital regulation can be understood in light
of the Modigliani-Miller (M-M) irrelevance hypothesis.4
Modigliani and Miller demonstrated that under certain assumptions—such as ignoring tax consequences and assuming frictionless
capital markets and perfect information—a corporation’s capital
structure is irrelevant to its value. In the world posited by M-M, a
firm has precisely the same value whether it is financed % by
debt, % by equity, or with any combination of debt and equity
you choose.
In the M-M world, the question naturally arises: Why should
we have any type of capital regulation? If capital structure is irrelevant to firm value, there would seem to be no reason at all to regulate the amount of equity capital in a firm.
Add to this another puzzle we can draw from basic economic
theory. Ordinarily, in a capitalist economy, we think it is appropriate
and necessary, even if unfortunate for the owners, that some firms
should fail. Failure of some firms is the inevitable consequence of
competition among many; and if we tried to prevent firms from
failing by insisting that they remain solvent at all times, the fundamental economic benefits of competition might be jeopardized.
So is there any possible justification for capital regulation? To see
the reasons for capital regulation, we must leave the perfect world of
M-M and enter the world of taxes and transactions costs in which
we live our imperfect lives. In the real world, we can posit at least
four principal reasons for requiring corporations to establish or
maintain certain levels of capital. These reasons may not be completely persuasive; indeed, the case for capital regulation is quite
problematic. But the justifications for capital regulation are sufficiently plausible to be worth serious consideration.
4 Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller, The Cost of Capital,
Corporation Finance, and the Theory of Investment,  American Economic
Review  ().
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The first, most obvious reason for capital regulation is that it
protects a firm against insolvency and all the attendant costs of
bankruptcy. If a firm’s capital is effectively regulated, it will never become insolvent. Either the firm will earn a profit from its operations, which will be applied, in part at least, to increase its capital, or
the firm will lose money and run up against its required capital ratios. When a firm has reached the point of legally inadequate capital,
its managers face a choice of actions: they can seek to recapitalize the
firm, say with a subscription offering to existing equity holders or by
inviting a new investor to stake a claim; they can seek a merger partner with adequate capital; they can sell assets if doing so will enhance the firm’s capital position; or they can arrange for the voluntary dissolution of the firm’s affairs before the capital becomes impaired. Note that none of these actions necessarily represents a social
cost aside from the transactions costs of organizing the transaction.
Capital regulation does not require that inefficient firms remain in
business; it is not the same, for example, as the conduct of business
through a government-owned enterprise that can never become
insolvent. Capital regulation simply shifts the point at which reorganization of a firm’s capital structure is likely to occur, and this in
itself has no obvious efficiency implications. Since under capital
regulation reorganization occurs prior to bankruptcy, this administrative technique offers the potential to significantly reduce
bankruptcy costs.
A second possible rationale for capital regulation is that it can
protect investors, particularly debt holders, who are not well situated
to protect themselves. In a world of high transactions costs, debt
holders may not be able to safeguard their interests adequately
against the threat that equity holders will take undue risks with the
firm’s assets and drive it into insolvency. Capital regulation might
provide debt holders with some assurance that the firm is solvent, at
least in its early days, and thus reduce the need for costly contracting
and monitoring of management to guard against excessively risky
ventures.
A third reason for capital regulation is that it can protect society
against inefficient activities by corporations which reduce social
wealth. We have noted that equity holders tend to be risk preferrers.
And, while some risk is desirable, there comes a point as the firm’s
equity capital becomes thin—that is, as a firm approaches insol-
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vency—when the equity holder would prefer almost any level of risk,
even if the project in question is a loser for the firm on a present
value basis. To take an extreme example, assume that the firm has
already lost so much money that there is only one dollar left in net
worth. At this point the equity holders have an incentive to take
wild risks—even causing the firm to invest in lottery tickets—because they stand to lose, at most, only one dollar if the risks don’t
pan out, while if the unexpected happens and the firm wins the
lottery, the equity holders get all the benefit of the payoff. Capital
regulation tends to mitigate this problem of inefficient investment.
A final possible argument in favor of capital regulation is that,
despite its shortcomings, it is arguably the best available strategy for
accomplishing the social objectives of reducing bankruptcy costs,
protecing debt holders, and policing against socially inefficient corporate behavior. We could, for example, imagine a system of command-and-control regulation under which the state scrutinizes the
actions of corporate managers in order to ensure that they are not
excessively risky. But command-and-control regulation arguably
would be undesirable, since it would effectively substitute the state as
corporate manager, and states have not shown themselves as particularly effective in managing business corporations. Capital regulation
is a potentially better alternative to command-and-control regulation because it leaves the fundamental business decisions up to the
professional managers of firms, subject only to the constraint that
they must meet the applicable minimum capital rules.
Note that the case for capital regulation appears to be strongest
in two situations: where dispersed debt holders lack the means or the
incentive to protect their interests effectively; and where as a result
of thin capital equity holders develop an extreme taste for risk. It
turns out that these are indeed situations where we observe capital
regulations having bite in the real world.
As will be seen, there are quite a variety of different sorts of capital regulation, but to simplify the analysis we can sort them into two
general categories: ex ante regulations and ex post regulations. The
distinction turns on how capital requirements are enforced. Imagine
that the government wants a firm to maintain a specified level of
capital. To enforce this requirement, the government has basically
two choices. It can monitor the firm’s capital on an ongoing basis
and can regulate the firm’s behavior that poses a potential threat to
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the maintenance of adequate capital levels. This is ex ante regulation: the government monitors and regulates ex ante to ensure that
capital does not become depleted.
Alternatively, the government can adopt a hands-off strategy,
allowing the firm to make its own choices but imposing sanctions in
the event that the firm’s capital does fall below the specified levels.
This is the ex post approach. Obviously, the ex ante and ex post approaches are not mutually exclusive: a state could impose a combination of both strategies if it so chose.
Both the ex ante and the ex post approaches have encountered
serious obstacles in the American regulatory environment. Because it
entails pervasive and continuous monitoring of a firm’s affairs, the ex
ante approach requires a well-funded, active, and powerful administrative agency to enforce it. The American system of corporate federalism, in which states compete to provide corporate charters and
regulatory regimes for business enterprises, deters the creation of any
such agency. There are no administrative agencies at the state level
capable of undertaking the task of regulating firm capital, especially
in a world in which business is increasingly conducted on an interstate and even global scale. The federal government would be
equipped to handle the task; and it is no coincidence that most instances of ex ante regulation that are observed in the United States
are administered by the federal government. But the American system has elected to retain substantive corporate law regulation at the
state level, with only minimal federal involvement. Ex ante capital
regulation, accordingly, is simply not feasible for the average
American corporation.
The ex post approach generally requires that providers of equity
capital to the firm stand ready to make good some or all of the
shortfall, and thus it runs squarely into the basic rule of limited liability for corporate shareholders. If shareholder liability is to be limited, then holders of the firm’s equity capital cannot be required to
pay into the firm treasury additional amounts beyond their initial investments.
Both the ex post and the ex ante approaches, in short, face severe
difficulties, and it is these difficulties that have prevented capital
regulation from assuming a central a place in the American system.
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III. T  C R   U S
It turns out that capital regulation in this sense was an important form of social control of the business enterprise in the nineteenth century. During most of the twentieth century, however,
capital regulation ebbed in importance and became nearly vestigial,
although it has never disappeared entirely. More recently, capital
regulation has experienced a resurgence of importance in financial
services industries such as banking, insurance, and securities; and it
has suddenly become an important topic of scholarly debate in the
general corporate context as well. I will start with general corporate
regulation and then turn to capital adequacy regulation in the financial services sector.
A. General Corporate Regulation
We do, in fact, have rules in corporate law regulating firm capital
in the United States.5 Examine a corporate law statute today and
you will find provisions referring to the par value of stock—stating,
however, that a stock can have a par value or no par as the organizers
choose. Some states require that corporations start business with a
minimum capitalization that must be paid in before the firm can
commence business. And in disclosure statements under the securities law we routinely find the mysterious intonation that the shares
being sold are “fully paid and nonassessable.” These are vestiges of
what in the nineteenth century was a leading, if not the dominant
form of corporate law regulation in the United States: the par value
system.
The par value system required that a corporation start business
with an initial capitalization. There was a minimum, but the organizers of a corporation could establish any initial capitalization they
chose above the minimum. The capitalization had to be embodied
in par value stock, so if initial capital was set at ,,a firm would
have to distribute stock with a total par value of ,—for example, , shares of  par value each.
The catch was that the initial capitalization had to be actually
paid in. If stock was distributed without payment of the par value,
See, e.g., Bayless Manning, A Concise Textbook on Legal Capital -
(d ed. ); William A. Klein & John C. Coffee, Jr., Business Organization
and Finance - (th ed. ).
5
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the holder of the stock was liable for assessment in the event of
subsequent insolvency. A receiver in bankruptcy would sue the
holder of the stock for the difference between the par value and
what was actually paid in to the corporation for the stock. These par
value rules were very important at the time—if you examine nineteenth-century reporters, you will discover literally thousands of assessment lawsuits based on the par value system.
It is easy to see that the par value system was a form of capital
regulation. It required that firms have an initial capitalization and
provided a system of penalties if the capitalization was not paid in.
The purpose of the system was to protect creditors, who could look
to the par value for some indication of the value of the firm. The
system was also designed to protect members of the public who
bought equity in firms by assuring them that their stock was not
“watered”—that is, that the insiders who received the initial distribution had paid full price.
The par value system had many problems and ultimately failed.
Its defects included the following:
- Par value rules never coped adequately with the problem of insiders purchasing stock in exchange for services or property as opposed to cash. The danger of insider manipulation in this setting is
obvious, but the difficulty in valuing services or property made fraud
difficult to establish. While the system could have simply prohibited
the issuance of stock to insiders in exchange for property or services,
this was not a realistic option because in practice it is necessary for
corporate promoters to be compensated for their noncash contributions.
- The par value system provided very little information about the
valuation of a firm after its initial capitalization, since profits or losses
from operation were not reflected in the par value account. Thus the
informational content of the system degraded quickly over time.
- The par value system impaired the marketability of stock since
liability followed the holder; purchasers of stock faced the possibility
of being assessed if the initial purchaser had failed to pay in the par
value. Par value stock could even obtain a negative value when the
value of the claim on the corporation’s assets and income stream fell
short of the assessment exposure. In such a setting, holders would
try to foist stock off on impecunious persons in order to avoid their
assessment obligations.
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- Assessment litigation was time consuming and expensive, since
holders had to be tracked down and assessed. Moreover, in many
cases the holders of the par value stock were also officers or directors
of the failed firms; these people were likely to be in personal financial distress when their firms failed, and therefore were often unable
to pay out on assessments even if they were ordered.
Ultimately, business lawyers vitiated the par value system by developing low par and no par stock. The market price of such stock
was far above the par value, so there was little or no danger that the
holder of low par or no par stock would be assessed. Moreover, with
no par or low par stock there was no real prospect that the insiders
would be held liable for fraud in the public securities flotation, since
the value of the shares being distributed was sure to be higher than
the stated par value. These advantages came at the cost of eliminating any residual utility the par value system might have held as a
mechanism for regulating corporate capital structure. With low par
and no par stock, corporations operated free of any realistic requirements that they start with, or maintain, any particular level of capital. In place of par value, the legal system developed a philosophy of
disclosure, both at the federal level and at the state level with the enactment of “blue sky” securities laws.
One important reason for the failure of the American par value
system of capital regulation is the fact that there was no administrative agency in place capable of enforcing the system effectively. The
secretary of state who issued the corporate charter did not monitor
the corporate capital structure. The states had little incentive to take
on the burden of regulating corporate capital structure. In the case
of large corporations where the par value system was important, any
attempt by the secretary of state to exercise a significant supervisory
power would be met with a likely decision by the corporation to
move to another, less restrictive jurisdiction. The result would merely
be the loss of corporate franchise taxes for the state. It was simply
not in a state’s interest to administer an effective system of capital
regulation.
We can usefully contrast the American experience with that of
many European countries, where capital regulation of corporations
is much more important. Because most European countries operate
under unitary systems of corporate law where the competition for
charters is not a factor, administrative agencies can police the capital
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rules effectively. In Belgium, for example, a relatively stringent system of ex ante monitoring and enforcement ensures that minimum
capital regulations remain effective throughout a corporation’s existence. Formal appraisals are required for all insider transfers to ensure
that capital is fully subscribed. If a corporation’s equity becomes less
than half the issued capital, the board of directors has the obligation
to organize a shareholders meeting to discuss dissolution of the
company or restoration of capital. The system is backed up by a system of supervision by powerful administrative officials.
In Switzerland, the law requires that corporations maintain
capital stock and statutory reserves. If the annual balance sheet
shows that half of the capital stock and reserves is no longer covered,
the board of directors is obligated to call a meeting of shareholders
and to propose measures for restructuring. Failure to comply with
this law subjects the board members to personal liability. Moreover,
it is a crime in Switzerland to go bankrupt either through fraud or
carelessness, or to fail to keep accurate records.
Similar provisions for minimum capital exist in most European
countries, as well as in countries elsewhere in the world. But a system such as that which exists in these countries could not exist in
the United States under our current system of corporate law. The
United States is actually an anomalous jurisdiction in this respect:
the considerable majority of countries around the world maintain a
level of capital regulation for their corporations that far exceeds that
obtaining in the United States under the vestigial par value system.
However, par value is not the only form of capital regulation for
corporations in the United States. We also have a number of explicit
ex post remedies for capital shortfall. The most prominent of these
remedies is piercing the corporate veil, a doctrine which allows creditors of a corporation to proceed against the shareholders notwithstanding the “veil” of limited liability. Veil-piercing is a form of ex
post capital regulation, since it imposes liability after insolvency on
the shareholders of a firm that has been operated with inadequate
capital. Although the stated requirements for piercing the veil are
complex and indeterminate, the central issue is capital adequacy. If a
corporation is being run on inadequate capital, the likelihood that a
court will hold its shareholders liable for the corporation’s debts and
torts is much higher than if capital is considered to be adequate.
Note that while par value is a mixture of ex ante and ex post regula-
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tion, albeit an unsuccessful one, veil piercing is purely ex post: there
is no official monitor of a firm’s capital and the sanction is administered only after insolvency.
The problem with veil piercing, of course, is that of determining
how much capital is enough. Any firm that fails has by definition
been run on inadequate capital at some point; but if this were
enough to pierce the veil, we would not have a doctrine of limited liability at all. The legal decisions often refer to the fact that a corporation has been operated on insufficient capital, but never do the
courts come up with any workable definition of how much capital is
enough. Largely for this reason, the corporate veil is pierced only
very rarely and in extreme circumstances in the United States. Veil
piercing is not a particularly effective form of capital regulation.
In addition to veil piercing, capital adequacy is policed, to an extent, by bankruptcy rules that allow the trustee in bankruptcy to recapture certain transfers made to corporate shareholders in contemplation of or within a specific time before the insolvency. Other
rules of equitable subordination in bankruptcy allow the bankruptcy
judge to subordinate debt claims of shareholders to the claims of
others in cases where the shareholder has used his or her insider
status to obtain an inequitable position vis-à-vis other creditors.
These bankruptcy rules are also a form of capital regulation, but, as
in the case of veil piercing, they are limited in their application,
largely because they are in tension with the general rule of limited liability for corporate shareholders.
Recently, corporate law scholarship has begun to revisit the basic
question of limited liability. Professors Hansmann and Kraakman
have written a controversial article in which they claim that the
benefits of limited liability are overstated and recommend exploration of unlimited liability for corporate shareholders, at least for
tort liability.6 Note that, from the perspective of this lecture,
Hansmann and Kraakman have recommended a form of capital
regulation. For, to the extent that a firm’s shareholders have unlimited liability, the firm’s effective capital is greatly increased—to the
point where the capital of a widely held firm, if such could exist under a regime of unlimited liability, would be virtually infinite.
6

Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited
Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts,  Yale Law Journal  ().
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Hansmann and Kraakman’s argument for unlimited liability has
not persuaded many in the academic community—and certainly very
few outside the ivory tower—because of the perception that unlimited liability would be extremely disruptive to capital formation and
quite expensive to administer.7 Imagine a capital market where there
is unlimited liability. Stock would be worth more in some hands
than others. The rich might not want to buy stock at all. People
would make efforts to disguise their ownership by vesting legal title
in impecunious individuals while keeping some form of beneficial
title for themselves. At some point, when a firm approached
insolvency, its stock would actually take on a negative value—much
as in the case of the old system of par value stock. People who held
unlimited liability stock would be willing to pay others to take it off
their hands. Those who were willing to hold the stock would not
have the assets to pay on the assessments. The system appears so
fraught with problems as to be nearly unworkable.
But, while unlimited, joint and several liability may not make
sense, there are other ways to structure a liability regime to give
shareholders some responsibility for a corporation’s debts or torts.
The most viable system is a form of multiple liability, where shareholders take on a liability for assessment when they purchase stock,
but only up to a specific and defined amount. Such a system actually
existed in the American banking industry for more than  years,
prior to the Great Depression; similar rules obtained in England,
Scotland, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. This was a system
of double liability, under which a bank shareholder would be liable
for assessment for the benefit of creditors in the event the bank
failed, but only up to the par value of the shareholder’s stock.
Professor Macey and I have studied the operation of this system
and found that, in general, it was a success.8 About half the
amounts assessed were actually collected, a good recovery figure given
the fact that many bank shareholders became personally insolvent
when their banks failed. Beyond this, the assessment remedy tended
to discourage risk taking by bank managers at the point where the
7 For a justification of limited liability from the law-and-economics perspective, see Easterbrook and Fischel, supra note , at -.
8 Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, Double Liability of Bank
Shareholders: History and Implications,  Wake Forest Law Review  ().
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bank’s capital became impaired: instead of becoming risk preferrers at
this point, the shareholders became risk avoiders, because they knew
that if the bank were to become insolvent, they would be personally
liable for its debts. Thousands of banks voluntarily liquidated during
this period, evidently because the owners recognized that the institution was in danger of failing and chose to wind up or sell its operations while it was still solvent rather than risk personal assessment
liability. Some of the perverse effects of unlimited liability were observed: for example, when a bank was close to failure, people became
extremely generous with their stock, foisting it off on their children
or any impecunious person they could find; but the courts were very
effective at tracking down these transfers and fixing the assessment
liability on the prior holder. The system of double liability was vigorously enforced during this period. There are over  decisions by
the United States Supreme Court on this topic, and thousands of
cases in the lower courts. Ironically, Congress and the states repealed
the double liability regime during the s because of the belief that
federal deposit insurance was a cheaper and preferable method for
protecting bank creditors.
Although multiple liability would appear to be a potentially viable ex post system of capital regulation, one with good monitoring
effects and a workable, if somewhat cumbersome, legal structure, the
U.S. legal system has not opted for such a regime outside the financial services area. The general rule has been one of limited liability.
B. Regulation of Financial Firms
In general, therefore, the regulatory system in the United States
has elected not to regulate firm capital, beyond the vestigial par value
system, the specialized bankruptcy rules, and the doctrine of corporate veil piercing. There is one area, however, where far from being
moribund, capital regulation is alive and growing: the financial services industry. Banks, savings and loans, broker-dealers, commodities
brokers, and insurance firms are all required to meet minimum capital standards. These standards have not been losing force over time;
on the contrary, capital regulation is increasingly viewed as an essential part of the regulatory landscape for these firms. Why is it that
capital regulation has been so important in these industries, whereas
it has been much less important elsewhere?
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The significance of capital adequacy regulations in the financial
services sector is largely due to the presence for each industry of regulatory bodies with sufficient powers and jurisdiction to impose a
form of ex ante capital regulation—the federal and state banking
regulators, the SEC, the CFTC, the state insurance commissioners.
The American system of regulatory federalism which prevents effective capital regulation for corporations generally does not affect
these financial service industries in the same way. Thus, these industries are regulated much more like the European system than the
American one so far as capital adequacy is concerned.
Beyond this, financial services is a field where the justifications
for capital regulation appear particularly strong. Creditors in such industries—bank depositors, private customers of securities firms,
holders of insurance policies—are often dispersed and unsophisticated. They may lack effective means for protecting their own interests against expropriation by the equity holders. Further, creditors
often lack the financial incentive to monitor against risk taking by
corporate managers. Depositors in banks and savings and loans are
protected by federal deposit insurance and accordingly have no incentive whatever to monitor their institutions (unless they are foolish enough to have more than the insurance ceiling on deposit at a
bank). Insurance policy holders are protected by insurance guarantee
systems, and securities customers are insured by the SIPC. These
protections for creditors take them out of danger, but place the insurance funds at even more severe risk, because the insurance removes the marketplace discipline against excessive risk taking by corporate managers that would otherwise exist.
Moreover, some of these industries—banking and insurance are
examples—operate at high leverage ratios relative to industrial firms.
That is, a bank’s equity capital is typically only a small percentage of
its total capitalization. This means that there is a relatively thin
margin against insolvency, so that if a bank suffers unanticipated
losses, there is a serious risk that it will become insolvent. And, once
a bank is insolvent, the risk taking incentives of its owners go wild;
the owners will be willing to take on nearly any sort of risk in order
to gamble on a possible return to solvency, knowing that if the risks
do not pay off, others will pick up the tab.
This combination of factors—powerful regulators, unsophisticated and dispersed creditors, moral hazard created by insurance, and
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highly leveraged capital structures—makes the financial services industry particularly suitable for capital regulation. In the banking area,
capital regulation is now viewed in some quarters as nearly a panacea
to all the problems which have afflicted that industry over the past
ten years.
Although there is good reason to suppose that capital regulation
may be beneficial in the financial services sector, those who view
such a regulatory system as any sort of panacea are excessively optimistic. It is certainly true that capital regulation is preferable to
command-and-control regulation because it leaves much greater
room for entrepreneurship and private decision making. But capital
regulation has in no way displaced command-and-control regulation
for financial services firms; on the contrary, the enhanced capital
rules have merely supplemented the existing regulatory framework.
This is perhaps not so much a conceptual as a political point:
Congress in its wisdom does not want to be criticized for failing to
regulate the financial services industry in light of the catastrophe
that happened in the banking and savings and loan industries. State
regulators of insurance firms are equally averse to criticism for alleged
shortfalls on their watch. Enhanced capital standards have not, in
practice, led to any form of deregulation in the command-and-control system.
More fundamentally, the justifications for capital adequacy regulation mentioned at the outset of this paper may not be entirely
persuasive. A fundamental problem with capital regulation is simply
that we have no idea how much capital is enough. The rules we
have in place for the banking industry now are not based on any
kind of systematic analysis; they were adopted by bureaucrats in
Basle, Switzerland, based on no discernible theory other than expediency. The rules largely reflect political tradeoffs among the signatories of the Basle accord rather than any sort of objective analysis.
Even if we assume that the rules now in place are roughly appropriate, there are serious questions as to the efficacy of capital
regulation as a means of measuring insolvency risk. Capital tends to
be a lagging indicator of insolvency: many banks and savings and
loans that failed drastically had perfectly adequate capital ratios only a
few months before the disaster. Capital regulation is inevitably built
on accounting conventions that may be only a very imperfect
indicator of true market values or business prospects.
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Further, capital regulation is inevitably imperfect in its application and encourages all sorts of regulatory avoidance measures. For
example, the rule used to be that banks had to hold a certain amount
of equity capital as a percentage of their assets. This was a very ineffective way to deter risk taking, because any bank that wanted to
achieve a given level of risk could simply step up the riskiness of its
assets—a three percent capital ratio may be perfectly fine when held
against a portfolio of treasury bonds, but not when offset against
speculative derivative instruments. The new rules attempt to correct
for this problem by weighting the assets according to risk, but to be
administrable, the risk weightings have to be exceedingly gross. For
example, nearly all unsecured private debt has a hundred percent risk
weighting—so that an unsecured loan to a local dry cleaner has the
same risk weighting as a loan to General Motors. A bank can easily
arbitrage within asset categories in order to increase its level of risk.
Finally, there are real problems about what to do when there is a
capital shortfall. The old rules gave the agencies a great deal of discretion about whether to shut down a capital-impaired bank or not.
This resulted in fiascoes in which important politicians did political
favors for friends by intervening with the regulators in order to keep
insolvent institutions open. Congress reacted by adopting a regime
of nondiscretionary administrative sanctions under which the agencies are required to take increasingly stringent steps to rectify capital
impairment as an institution slides toward insolvency.
Although this system of prompt corrective action is nearly universally admired, there are obvious problems with it. How soon
should an institution be closed? If you close it while it is still solvent,
you are going to prevent losses to creditors, but there will be significant social costs because a potentially viable institution is being
closed. If we look at private contracts, we do not see creditors automatically closing down debtors even on default. The creditor will
renegotiate the debt if, in its judgment, the insolvency costs exceed
the losses from renegotiation. But under our system of prompt correction action, the agencies have no power to act as private creditors
would in a similar situation; they have to close the institution under
penalty of law.
My own mind is still unsettled with respect to the value of solvency regulation. It is true that capital regulation can offer potential
efficiencies to solve free-rider and collective action problems for
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creditors and can mitigate problems associated with inefficiently
risky investments and insolvency costs. On the other hand, capital
regulation has significant problems and costs of its own. For the
foreseeable future, we are unlikely to observe effective capital regulation much beyond the financial services area in the United States,
although, as we have seen, capital requirements are a much more
significant part of the regulatory landscape in Europe. But within
the U.S. financial services sector, capital has become an important
regulatory strategy. It is therefore appropriate that business lawyers
and business law scholars begin to grapple intensively with the
complex issues posed by this interesting and potentially far-reaching
approach to the legal control of the American corporation.
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